UNITY OF SCIENCE AS A WORKING HYPOTHESIS . . . 3
Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam
1. Introduction, 3. 2. Unity of Science and Micro-Reduction, 5. 3. Reductive Levels, 9. 4. The Credibility of Our Working Hypothesis, 11. 5. Past Successes at Each Level, 16. 6. Evolution, Ontogenesis, and Synthesis, 23. 7. Concluding Remarks, 27. Notes, 29. References, 32.
THE THEORETICIAN'S DILEMMA: A STUDY IN THE LOGIC OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION . . . 37
Carl G. Hempel
1. Deductive and Inductive Systematization, 37. 2. Observables and Theoretical Entities, 41. 3. Why Theoretical Terms? 43. 4. Structure and Interpretation of a Theory, 46. 5. The Theoretician's Dilemma, 49. 6. Operational Definitions and Reduction Sentences, 50. 7. On the Definability of Theoretical Terms by Means of an Observational Vocabulary, 53. 8. Interpretative Systems, 71. 9. Functional Replaceability of Theoretical Terms, 75. 10. On Meaning and Truth of Scientific Theories, 81. Notes, 87. References, 94.
DEFINITIONS, EXPLANATIONS, AND THEORIES . . . 99
Michael Scriven
1. General Introduction, 99. 2. Analytic Method, 99. 3. Definitions: Introduction, 102. 4. Dictionary Definitions, 102. 5. Erroneous Definitions, 103. 6. Dictionaries versus Encyclopedias, 104. 7. Definitions as Substitution Rules, 105. 8. 'Undefinable' terms, 107. 9. Inter-categorical Definitions, 112. 10. The Definition of "Definition", 113. 11. The Misleading Analogy with Mathematical Definition; The Actual Limitations on Redefinition, 116. 12. Definitions of Logical Constants in Symbolic Logic, 119. 13. Definitions as Analyses, 121. 14. Definability and Reducibility, 122. 15. The Concept of 'Completed Science,' 127. 16. The Acceptable Aspects of Reductionism, 128. 17. Definitions in Terms of Linguistic Function, 132. 18. The Analyticity of Definitions and Statements about Linguistic Function, 135. 19. Definitions as Rules, 139. 20. Dictionary Definitions as Reports of Usage, 140. 21. The Truth of Rules, 142. 22. Stipulative Definitions, 145. 23. Final Assessment of Definitions-as-Rules View, 149. 24. The Application and Invocation of Rules, 150. 25. Names of Individuals, 151. 26. The 'Stipulative' Definition of Individual Names, 155. 27. The Names of Fictitious Individuals, 156. 28. Existence as a Presupposition of Names, 158. 29. General Names and Scientific Concepts, 160. 30. Conditional Definitions, 164. 31. Statistical Concepts and Vagueness, 175. 32. Dispositional Concepts, Theory Language, and Observation Language, 180. 33. The Micro-Equivalents of Macro-Properties, 187. 34. Complicated Conditional Concepts, Psychological Dispositions, 188. 35. The Theoretician's Dilemma, 191. 36. Explanations, 192.
DISPOSITION CONCEPTS AND EXTENSIONAL LOGIC . . . 196
Arthur Pap
COUNTERFACTUALS, DISPOSITIONS, AND THE CAUSAL MODALITIES . . . 225
Wilfrid Sellars
Introduction, 225. I. Counterfactuals, 227. II. Thing-Kinds and Causal Properties, 248. III. Causal Connection: The Dialectic of the Controversy, 266. IV. Toward a Theory of the 'Causal' Modalities, 285. References, 307.
GENERAL STATEMENTS AS RULES OF INFERENCE? . . . 309
H. Gavin Alexander
PERSONS . . . 330
P. F. Strawson
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EXPERIENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL FOR THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY . . . 354
Karl Zener
THE "MENTAL" AND THE "PHYSICAL," . . . 370
Herbert Feigl
I. A Preliminary Survey of Some Perplexities and Their Repression, 370. II. The Scientific and the Philosophical Strands in the Mind-Body Tangle, 374. III. Requirements and Desiderata for an Adequate Solution of the Mind-Body Problem. A Concise Statement of the Major Issues, 387. IV. Sorting Out the Various Meanings of "Mental" and "Physical". A Comparative and Critical Analysis, 397: A. "Subjective" versus "Objective", 397; B. Non-Spatial versus Spatial, 406; C. Quality versus Quantity, 409; D. "Purposive" versus "Mechanical", 411; E. "Mnemic", "Holistic", "Emergent" versus "Non-Mnemic", "Atomistic", "Compositional", 413; F. "Intentional" versus "Non-Intentional", 416. V. Mind-Body Identity. Explications and Supporting Arguments 419: A. Review of the More Basic Meanings and Connotations of "Mental" and "Physical". Conclusions regarding their Respective Merits and Demerits, 419; B. The Inference to Other Minds, 425; C. The Cognitive Roles of Acquaintance, 431; D. Reduction and Identification in Scientific Theories, 438; E. Arguments Concerning the Identification of Sentience with Neural Events, 445 VI. A Budget of Unsolved Problems. Suggestions for Further Analyses and Research, 465: A. Is There a Phenomenal Language? The Relations of Meaning, Evidence, and Reference, 466; B. Unitary or Dual Language Reconstruction? 468; C. One-one Correspondence and the "Riddle of the Universe," 470; D. Some Remarks on the Philosophical Relevance of Open Scientific Questions in Psychophysiology, 478. Concluding Remark, 482. Note and References, 483.
WHEN SHALL WE USE OUR HEADS INSTEAD OF THE FORMULA? . . . 498
P. E. Meehl
APPENDIX: INTENTIONALITY AND THE MENTAL
Introduction . . . 507
Wilfrid Sellars
Sentences about Believings . . . 510
Roderick M. Chisholm
Chisholm-Sellars Correspondence on Intentionality . . . 521
NAME INDEX . . . 540
SUBJECT INDEX . . . 544