Ideas about plurality in science are circulating among philosophers and pluralism has been advanced through a number of case studies concerning a variety of sciences. But different views are being advanced under the name of pluralism. Some case studies motivate modest epistemological conclusions that are difficult to distinguish from monism. Other studies argue for extreme positions that are difficult to distinguish from radical relativism. The case studies offered in this book support a truly pluralist interpretation of scientific knowledge that doesn't slide into the view that anything goes. Although the contributors to this book have not endorsed a single view (they are, after all, pluralists!), their case studies provide us with a broad empirical basis to argue for a consistent stance on pluralism. This stance provides an alternative to the monistic ideals typically taken for granted by philosophers of science during the second half of the twentieth century. We argue that the pluralist stance has important implications that should influence the ways we analyze and assess scientific knowledge.   Return

     In this paper I explore the extent to which a perspectival understanding of scientific knowledge supports forms of “scientific pluralism.” I do not initially attempt to formulate a general characterization of either perspectivism or scientific pluralism. I assume that both are opposed to two extreme views. The one extreme is a (monistic) metaphysical realism according to which there is in principle one true and complete theory of everything. The other extreme is a constructivist relativism according to which scientific claims about any reality beyond that of ordinary experience are merely social conventions. I begin with an exemplar of perspectival knowledge, namely, that gained through color vision, and go on to consider possible pluralistic implications of this sort of knowledge. Then I will attempt to extend the lessons from this exemplar to scientific observation generally and, finally, to scientific theorizing. After exploring connections between the complexity of the world and a scientific pluralism, I conclude by locating the whole discussion in the broader framework of a scientific naturalism.  Return

     Having clarified, somewhat, what is meant here by 'pluralism', this paper seeks primarily to illustrate one brand of pluralism in the context of a specific problem in quantum theory, the problem of providing a dynamics for the actual properties of physical systems. The problem is explained at an elementary level, and the nature of the pluralism involved in one solution is discussed, with particular attention to the issue of avoiding a collapse into crude relativism.   Return

     A plurality of approaches to foundational aspects of mathematics is a fact of life. Two loci of this are discussed here, the classicism/constructivism controversy over standards of proof, and the plurality of universes of discourse for mathematics arising in set theory and in category theory, whose problematic relationship is discussed. The first case illustrates the hypothesis that a sufficiently rich subject matter may require a multiplicity of approaches. The second case, while in some respects special to mathematics, raises issues of ontological multiplicity and relativity encountered in the natural sciences as well.  Return

     Since pluralism itself is a reflexive doctrine, this paper develops an understanding of various forms of pluralism, or lack thereof, in economics. In particular, it argues that pluralism in economics is recurring, but often denied. Instead of locating the source in epistemology, metaphysics, and the like, the analysis in the paper proposes that the lack of success of the monist movement in economics strengthens the case for pluralism, and therefore suggests that pluralism is contingently true. It starts by offering an overview of movements towards monism about theories, showing that repeated efforts at securing a single theory have failed. These developments have extended towards the level of economies, as evidenced by ineffective attempts to treat economic agents monistically. The lack of success of these efforts to achieve monism has paved the way for a (full-fledged) return to pluralism, as concluded by this paper.  Return

     Four principal approaches to studying human behavior are explored: classical and molecular behavior genetics, developmental psychology, neurobiology, Developmental Systems Theory.  The analysis brings out their questions, hypotheses, methods, and assumptions in an effort to identify what they share and what differentiates them from each other.   These approaches focus on different putative causal factors and are often embroiled in the nature-nurture debate.  The paper argues that, structurally, the differences between the approaches are based in different parsings of the causal space, i.e. different ways of identifying candidate factors.  These parsings are not empirically based, but are required to get inquiry off the ground.  Their non-congruence means that the approaches can neither be integrated nor treated as competitors at most one of which can be correct.  Instead each provides partial knowledge of human behavior.  Comprehensive understanding of the etiology of behavior requires a plurality of approaches, rather than a single theory.  Return

     The evolutionary maintenance of sexual reproduction is a case of explanatory pluralism of central importance to evolutionary biology. I analyze this pluralism from an epistemological perspective. My thesis is that the various explanations of sex are explanatory by virtue of local factors and hence are importantly distinct from one another and cannot be subsumed under a single unifying framework. A critic may argue that philosophical accounts of mechanism can provide just such a framework. I show that this attempt at unification fails because the accounts of sex are not explanatory simply in light of being their being mechanistic; rather they are explanatory because they are particular kinds of mechanisms. The explanatory power of a mechanism is dependent on its epistemological context and the contexts of these mechanisms differ.  Return

      A growing consensus holds that in order to understand science we must use more than one disciplinary approach. This essay defends a particular conception of multi-disciplinarity in Science Studies that will be called “Disciplinary Pluralism.” Such an conception does not dictate any particular form of interaction -- the disciplines may combine, cooperate, compete, or remain aloof from one another. The argument for disciplinary pluralism in science studies draws much inspiration from pluralistic positions within the sciences themselves, which reject the assumption that comprehensive accounts are always possible and desirable. The defense of disciplinary pluralism will address concerns about interdisciplinary approaches and clarify how pluralism differs from other conceptions of multi-disciplinary work. An examination of the variety of metaphors for the relationship between disciplines will help to illustrate how disciplinary pluralism avoids the dangers of disciplinary imperialism and isolationism.   Return