Scientific Explanation

Four Decades of Scientific Explanation . . . 3
Wesley C. Salmon

  0. Introduction . . . 3
   0.1 A Bit of Background . . . 4
   0.2 The Received View . . . 8
  1. The First Decade (1948-57): Peace in the Valley
     (but Some Trouble in the Foothills) . . . 11
   1.1 The Fountainhead: The Deductive-Nomological Model . . . 12
   1.2 Explanation in History and Prehistory . . . 25
   1.3 Teleology and Functional Explanation . . . 26
  2. The Second Decade (1958-67): Manifest Destiny-
     Expansion and Conflict . . . 33
   2.1 A Major Source of Conflict . . . 35
   2.2 Deeper Linguistic Challenges . . . 37
   2.3 Famous Counterexamples to the Deductive-Nomological Model . . . 46
   2.4 Statistical Explanation . . . 50
       2.4.1 The Deductive-Statistical Model . . . 51
       2.4.2 The Inductive-Statistical Model . . . 53
   2.5 Early Objections to the Inductive-Statistical Model . . . 58
  3. The Third Decade (1968-77): Deepening Differences . . . 61
    3.1 The Statistical-Relevance Model . . . 62
    3.2 Problems with Maximal Specificity . . . 68
    3.3 Coffa's Dispositional Theory of Inductive Explanation . . . 83
    3.4 Explanation and Evidence . . . 89
    3.5 Explanations of Laws . . . 94
    3.6 Are Explanations Arguments? . . . 101
    3.7 The Challenge of Causality . . . 107
    3.8 Teleological and Functional Explanation . . . 111
    3.9 The End of a Decade/The End of an Era? . . . 116
 4. The Fourth Decade (1978-87): A Time of Maturation . . . 117
   4.1 New Foundations . . . 117
   4.2 Theoretical Explanation . . . 122
   4.3 Descriptive vs. Explanatory Knowledge . . . 126
   4.4 The Pragmatics of Explanation . . . 138
   4.5 Empiricism and Realism . . . 150
   4.6 Railton's Nomothetic/Mechanistic Account . . . 154
   4.7 Aleatory Explanation: Statistical vs. Causal Relevance . . . 166
   4.8 Probabilistic Causality . . . 168
   4.9 Deductivism . . . 172
   4.10 Explanations of Laws Again . . . 177
   4.11 A Fundamental Principle Challenged . . . 178
   
  5. Conclusion: Peaceful Coexistence? . . . 180
   5.1 Consensus or Rapprochement? . . . 180
   5.2 Agenda for the Fifth Decade . . . 185
  Chronological Bibliography . . . 196

Explanation and Metaphysical Controversy . . . 220
Peter Railton

Explanation: In Search of the Rationale . . . 253
Matti Sintonen

  1. Why-Questions . . . 254
  2. A Thin Logic of Questions . . . 257
  3. The Epistemic Conception of Explanation . . . 261
  4. Theory Nets and Explanatory Commitments . . . 265
  5. Pruning the Web of Belief . . . 269
  6. Beyond the Third Dogma of Empiricism . . . 273
  

  1. Introduction . . . 283
  2.. The Multiplicity, Diversity, and Incompleteness of
    Causal Explanations . . . 285
  3. The Canonical Form for Causal Explanations . . . 286
  4. Ontology . . . 288
  5. Why Probability Values Are Not Explanatory . . . 293
  6. Why Ask Why-Questions? . . . 296
  Appendix: The Causal Failures of the Covering-Law Model . . . 300

  1. Introduction . . . 307
  2. Some Initial Intuitions . . . 309
  3. Pure and Mixed Probabilities . . . 310
  4. Screening Off and Spurious Correlations . . . 312
  5. Spuriousness and Statistical Research . . . 314
  6. The Importance of the Single Case . . . 315
  7. The Compatibility of Probabilistic Intuitions with a
     Deterministic View of Causation . . . 317
  8. The Deterministic Causation of Chances . . . 319
  9. Rational Action . . . 321
 10. Quantitative Decisions . . . 322
 11. Causal and Evidential Decision Theory . . . 324
 12. Action and Causation Again . . . 328
 13. The Metaphysics of Probability . . . 330
 14. Causal Chains . . . 331
 15. Causal Asymmetry . . . 334
 16. Digression on Independence Requirements . . . 337
 17. Causal Processes and Pseudo-Processes . . . 341
 18. Negative Causes . . . 343

  1. The Primacy of Singular Causes . . . 349
  2. The Failure of the Defeasibility Account . . . 350
  3. Abstractions and Idealizations . . . 352
  4. Conclusion . . . 355

Explanation in the Social Sciences . . . 384
Merrilee H. Salmon

  1. Introduction . . . 384
  2. Interpretativism . . . 388
  3. Rationality and Explanations of Behavior . . . 394
  4. The Existence of Appropriate Laws . . . 399
  5. Ethical Issues . . . 404
  6. Conclusion . . . 408

  1. Introduction . . . 410
    1.1 Hempel's Accounts . . . 410
    1.2 Hempel's Problems . . . 411
  2. The Pragmatics of Explanation . . . 413
    2.1 Van Fraassen's Pragmatics . . . 414
    2.2 Why Pragmatics Is Not Enough . . . 415
    2.3 Possible Goals for a Theory of Explanation . . . 417
  3. Explanation as Delineation of Causes . . . 419
    3.1 Causal Why-Questions and Causal Explanations . . . 420
    3.2 Are there Noncausal Explanations
        of Singular Propositions? . . . 422
    3.3 Causal Explanation and Theoretical Explanation . . . 428
  4. Explanation as Unification . . . 430
    4.1 The Ideal of Unification . . . 430
    4.2 Argument Patterns . . . 432
    4.3 Systematization of Belief . . . 434
    4.4 Why-Questions Revisited . . . 435
    4.5 Explanatory Unification and Causal Dependence . . . 436
    4.6 Unification and Theoretical Explanation . . . 437
         4.6.1 Classical Genetics . . . 438
         4.6.2 Darwinian Evolutionary Theory . . . 442
         4.6.3 The Theory of the Chemical Bond . . . 445
         4.6.4 Conclusions from the Examples . . . 447
   5. A Defense of Deductive Chauvinism    448
    5.1 The Objection from Quantum Mechanics . . . 450
    5.2 The Idealization of Macro-Phenomena . . . 452
    5.3 Further Sources of Indeterminism? . . . 454
    5.4 Two Popular Examples . . . 455
    5.5 Explanation and Responsibility . . . 457
   6. Epistemological Difficulties for the Causal Approach . . . 459
    6.1 Hume's Ghost . . . 460
    6.2 Causal Processes and Causal Interactions . . . 461
         6.2.1 Some Problems about Processes . . . 463
         6.2.2 Troubles with Interactions . . . 464
    6.3 Causation and Counterfactuals . . . 470
    6.4 Justifying Counterfactuals . . . 473
    6.5 Changing the Epistemological Frarnework . . . 475
   7. Comparative Unification . . . 477
    7.1 Comparative Unification without Change of Belief . . . 477
    7.2 The Possibility of Gerrymandering . . . 480
    7.3 Asymmetry and Irrelevance . . . 482
      7.3.1 The"Hexed" Salt . . . 482
      7.3.2 Towers and Shadows . . . 484
      7.3.3 When Shadows Cross . . . 487
    7.4 Comparative Unification and Scientific Change . . . 488
   8. Metaphysical Issues . . . 494
    8.1 Correct Explanation . . . 494
    8.2 "What If the World Isn't Unified?" . . . 494
    8.3 Correct Explanation Again . . . 497
    8.4 Conclusions . . . 499

Index . . . 509