B. Another form of convergent pluralism tolerates a plurality of theories, not because there is something importantly right about one that cannot be captured by another (and vice-versa), but because it is difficult to predict pursuit of which theory (or research program) will lead to a theory that provides a complete account of the phenomena. This view endorses a division of cognitive labor in the short term as a means to achieving the long term goal: a single, complete and correct theory. But again, doesn't this form of pluralism reduce to monism? Might the plurality we see in science involve more than the hedging of bets? Might pluralism be motivated on the grounds that in some cases limiting ourselves to one model, however correct it is, will limit what we can represent and investigate?

C. If pluralism goes beyond the idea that the world is patchy or that we should hedge our bets, what is the source of pluralism in science? Does it result from the fact that the entities and processes that make up the world are so complex that any account or description of them is incomplete? Or is it due to a cognitive limitation on the part of human inquirers? If it is due to limitations, are the limitations merely delaying the development of a single comprehensive account or do they render such an achievement practically impossible?

D. Might the problems calling for pluralist resolution be solved by appealing to the superficial point that representing a complex phenomenon always entails making some aspects more salient than others. Or does a thoroughgoing and consistent pluralist position entail that even describing the fundamentals (e.g. the causality) of natural, social, and some artificial systems often entails constructing models that necessarily obscure some factors in order to make others perspicuous? Does describing all of the important elements of a system require constructing a plurality of models, with each element of the system represented in at least one model, but with no model describing all elements?

E. Some advocates of pluralism argue that the relevance of particular epistemic values varies across different scientific contexts (different domains, at different times, for people with different interests). Does such a view inevitably lead to an "anything goes" view? Might pluralism be invoked to legitimate the flat earth hypothesis, anti-relativity theory, or scientific creationism? Or can this idea be incorporated into pluralism in a way that can invoke epistemic values traditionally advocated in the philosophical literature including empirical success such that the resulting view can distinguish between good and bad science?

F. Do strong versions of pluralism imply anti-realism? The fundamental difference between scientific realists and anti-realists hinges on whether we are justified in believing that scientific models or theories represent what lies beyond the observable phenomena. Does pluralism undermine the idea that the representations of science represent the world? If it does not completely undermine this idea does it at least require a weaker form of realism than that advocated by many philosophers of science? Does it require, for instance, giving up the idea that science will answer the most fundamental questions because answers to these questions require convergence? (For instance, if a pluralist holds that the Copenhagen and Bohm interpretations are both good scientific models that merely represent the phenomena differently, how could they possibly think science could answer the question, is the world fundamentally deterministic?)

G. Insofar as pluralism entails the idea that we should recognize that different descriptions and different approaches are sometimes beneficial because some descriptions offer better accounts of some aspects of a complex situation and other descriptions provide better accounts of other aspects, it seems to imply that attempts to force a convergence may well obscure important aspects of a complex situation because it may be impossible to render perspicuous all the important factors of such a situation within a single descriptive framework, model, or theoretical account. Does this mean that pluralism is inconsistent with the cognitive value of exclusive comprehensiveness and the view that partial accounts are necessarily deficient?

H. Does pluralism also undermine the way philosophers analyze concepts, both those of science and metascience. Much of the analysis of concepts such as fitness in biology, function in psychology, or explanation in metascience hinges on finding counter-examples against various proposed analyses. Doesn't the counterexample method tacitly assume that there must be one kind of abstract thing that counts as fitness, function, or explanation? If one finds something that a proposed analysis can't account for, then the analysis is inferred to be inadequate. (For example, if a proposed analysis of fitness can't account for the long term, as opposed to the short term, evolution of a trait, then it is rejected. The idea behind such an argument is that the proposed analysis must not capture 'the' concept of fitness because the right interpretation of fitness will be useful for understanding all important aspects of a complex evolutionary process.)